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Abstract
In academic studies of the interface between developing countries and large multinational oil corpora
tions, scholars have noted that over time and through repeated interaction, the developing countries tend
to negotiate better outcomes for themselves: they progress along a learning curve by incrementally
improving their outcomes through bargaining and strategic interaction. This phenomenon can be
demonstrated in a number of oil-rich developing countries. Nigeria’s case, however, is more complex.
During the two decades following its independence, the state successfully negotiated for more control
over—made strides in the developing of the skills necessary to manage—its petroleum industry, as our
model would predict. Then, in a puzzling late-1970s-to-mid-1980s change of course, the government
abruptly gave back concessions, undermined local entrepreneurial endeavors, and repealed indigeniza
tion laws. This paper combines, in the analytic narrative tradition, the case study method with an
extensive form game; it applies a dynamic bargaining model to Nigeria’s historical experience, demon
strating that Nigeria improved its outcomes and ascended along the “bargaining learning curve,” only
to reverse policy and “unlearn,” with serious consequences for the Nigerian population. Even so, the
demonstration of both successful and improved outcomes in past negotiations give evidence that Nigeria
could once again ascend its bargaining learning curve if the government were to re-commit to such a
policy.
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Introduction

The past 40 years have seen much written about multinational corporations’
(MNCs’) investments in developing countries, particularly in the area of nonrenew
able resource extraction. This scholarly interest coincides with an exponential
increase in such investments and often focuses upon either the exploitative nature
of said relationships or the phenomenon known as the resource curse: a skewed
economy in which the state allows a single industry to dominate to the detriment of
all others.
However, a small number of researchers have taken up this subject with an eye
to understanding how resource-rich developing countries can do better for them
selves within the context of their relationships with MNCs (Moran, 1974; Smith &
Wells, 1975; Vernon, 1971). The intent of this article is to build upon their work,
focusing its analysis on this bargaining interface—giving particular attention to
Nigeria’s experience—exploring historical policy decisions made within the context
of negotiations over oil concessions, and analyzing the outcomes and resulting
effects on the Nigerian population.
The framework for analysis is that of analytic narrative, or historical case descrip
tion, combined with rational-choice methodology (Bates et al., 1998). The article
presents Moran’s dynamic bargaining model as a lens through which the negotia
tions may be viewed. The principal argument put forth is that Nigeria initially
ascended its bargaining learning curve; this is demonstrated through an extensive

form game that focuses on the dynamic bargaining between representatives of the
Nigerian government and Multinational Oil Corporations that took place mainly
between 1971–79.
However, after this period the state abruptly reversed course. Numerous policy
decisions were made that ﬁrst, gave back hard-won concessions to corporations, and
second, repealed indigenization laws and forcibly deterred local participation in
Nigeria’s oil industry. Through these actions, the state descended its own learning
curve, with serious consequences for its population that remain up to the present.
Although not the central focus of this article, an argument will be presented that
posits that corruption likely played a determining role in the implementation of
these otherwise puzzling policy decisions. Even so, the demonstration of both
successful and improved outcomes in the negotiations that took place in the past
give evidence that Nigeria could once again ascend on its bargaining learning curve
if the political will exists to promote policies focused on long-term gains that would
beneﬁt the greater population rather than short-term gains directed to the advan
tage of an elite few. Given the scope of this article, the subsequent issue of what the
state does with the increased (or decreased) share of the pie that it obtains through
bargaining will remain for future research.
The article proceeds as follows: The dynamic bargaining model that serves as the
framework for understanding bargaining policy decisions is presented. This is
followed by an overview of game theory, dynamic bargaining, and Bayesian equi
librium analysis. Next is the case study of Nigeria: a historical overview of the
bargaining policy decisions made by the Nigerian government is presented and,
subsequently, modeled in an extensive-form game. Following this, the policy deci
sion reversal that led to a “descent” on Nigeria’s learning curve is described. The
article concludes with a discussion of the ramiﬁcations that these policy decisions
have had up to the present day for Nigeria’s population, the government’s ﬁnancial
state of affairs, and the eventual (in)ability of the indigenous populations to develop
the monitoring, operating, and supervisory skills necessary to reduce dependence
on the corporations.
The Dynamic Bargaining Model
Multinational extractive corporations must, in their search for unexploited
resources, negotiate with the governments of the developing countries in which
such resources are generally found. As such, states seldom have an established legal
framework for these relationships and individual contracts must be negotiated. Yet
because they are designed to cover all aspects related to a nascent yet complex
industry, the contracts are often less than ideal and need to be altered over time, as
conditions change.
At the outset, the two actors enter into negotiations in widely divergent situations.
The MNC has monopolistic control over the technology necessary to develop the
natural resource in question. It also possesses a great deal of business and negotia
tion acumen in the form of large legal teams experienced in the process in general
and, speciﬁcally, as it relates to oil. Conversely, the developing country possesses
neither bargaining experience nor expertise relevant to the development of an oil
industry.

With such a seemingly insurmountable inequity in place, many were surprised
when, in the 1970s, academic observation of the historical record of MNCs’ and
developing countries’ interaction found that over time, agreements between the two
actors tended to become increasingly favorable to the developing country (Mikesell,
1971; Moran, 1974; Smith & Wells, 1975).
Theodore Moran studied the Chilean copper industry and formulated a testable
hypothesis to explain this phenomenon; the resulting theory came to be known
as the dynamic bargaining model. Moran writes of a learning curve for developing
countries: over time they gain experience in bargaining and business and become
better negotiators. Negotiation and strategic interaction incrementally improve
their outcomes; they form contracts more favorable to their side—Moran (1974)
calls this “ascending the bargaining learning curve.” As the states gain experience
and conﬁdence, they take steps to ensure that their indigenous populations develop
the technical and management skills necessary to manage the industries without
dependence on the corporations.
Successful ventures . . . provide an incentive for the host country to develop skills and
expertise appropriate to the industry. Beginning with elementary attempts to tighten the
bargaining process, the country starts to move up a learning curve that leads from
monitoring industry behavior to replicating complicated corporate functions. (Moran,
1974, p. 1)

This article is concerned with the application of Moran’s theory to a case study of
Nigeria in which the state’s historical experience in developing its oil industry
and doing business and negotiating with large MNCs is examined. Moran’s
theory builds on the Obsolescing Bargain Model developed by Raymond Vernon
(1980),1 which states that when a bargain is struck and a corporation makes its
initial investments, the bargaining position between it and the government
involved immediately begins to change. The promise of investment is no longer
a bargaining chip for the corporation and it ﬁnds itself with incentives to stay in
the country: to avoid losing sunk costs and to reap the ﬁnancial rewards envi
sioned in its proﬁt projections. As soon as the initial investment-associated risks
have disappeared and the corporation begins to realize a proﬁt—in the case
of petroleum, often a windfall—the host country starts to question the beneﬁt
distribution proﬁle of the original contract. In retrospect, such agreements
“invariably have the appearance . . . of the strong (company) cheating the weak
(country)” (Moran, 1974, p. 160); this results in a developing country calling for
contract renegotiations.
Scholars of concession arrangements traditionally viewed these contracts as a
one-time bargain reﬂecting a win/loss relationship between the two negotiating
parties. In the 1970s this position began to change; Smith and Wells (1975) and
Moran (1974) argued that this notion was unrealistic given the numerous renego
tiations and even expropriations in the world oil industry during the 1960s. The
“win/loss” viewpoint ignored changes occurring—both within the industry and the
host country—that shift the relative strength of bargaining positions over time;
these changes are ultimately reﬂected in the nature of the contracts. In addition, by
portraying bargains as zero-sum games, the stark scenario employed within static
analysis did not accurately reﬂect reality. In fact, contract negotiations allow both

sides to realize a mutuality of interests, employing a non-zero sum perspective in
which bargaining determines the division of rewards—the collective “pie”—
between the two players. Thus, both may beneﬁt.
Smith and Wells (1975, p. 246) directed future researchers to take into account
economic, social, and political forces at work in the host country, the MNCs’
interests and position in the global industry, and the dynamics of the industry
itself when analyzing contract negotiations. They lamented the fact that
game theory (in the 1970s) did not offer a model sufﬁcient for a more dynamic
view.
The ensuing 35 years, however, have seen considerable advances in the nonco
operative, dynamic, and iterated areas of game theory methodology and
application—the areas speciﬁcally applicable to bargaining theory. Morrow (1994,
p. 3) argues that game theory now provides a tool for all social scientists: formal
developments have pushed the methodology in ways unimaginable at ﬁrst. He
further asserts that it should be employed as a primary method of addressing the
substantive issues that have arisen in the intervening years.
McKern (1993) points out—on a related note—that host countries have shifted
their bargaining priorities from a focus solely on ﬁscal beneﬁts toward a more
complex schedule of needs and desires designed to realize both direct and indi
rect beneﬁts. The application of a more descriptive, extensive form of game is
thus a better ﬁt in this case; a reduced mathematical methodology can be insuf
ﬁcient to an understanding of the entire range of the actors’ concerns—which
can include political and social considerations far beyond those mathematically
measurable.
The need for a methodology that allows for more complexity follows logically
from the increasingly multifarious nature of negotiations between developing coun
tries and MNCs (McKern, 1993, p. 245). Host countries have moved, over time,
from naively viewing MNC royalty payments as a “windfall reward” to a position of
experienced negotiators dealing competently with taxation, ownership, and man
agement, as well as with employment, environmental, infrastructural, investment,
technology, and local economy concerns, among others (Moran, 1974, pp. 163–64).
As some of these issues are more difﬁcult to measure quantitatively than others, a
descriptive methodology that underscores the continued need for the case study is
necessary. This is a point on which all of the scholars mentioned earlier would
agree: they all have employed case studies in their research.
And yet it is important that research does not stop at the case-study level.
Qualitative and quantitative methods complement each other and ultimately must
be combined (Odell, 2001). Herein is presented a framework for a systematic, game
theoretic analysis of the MNC–developing country bargaining interface, one that
can be—and has been—applied across relevant cases in conjunction with an
in-depth descriptive historical analysis (Hosman, 2009), thereby combining quali
tative and quantitative methods.
Back to Moran’s theory: As previously stated, negotiations between the host
country and the oil corporation are no longer viewed as a one-time occurrence. By
taking strategic initiatives, the developing country seeks to strengthen its bargaining
position in various ways over time. These initiatives may include a more thorough
learning about the oil industry in general and the status of the achievements of

nations in similar situations. A state enterprise may be established to monitor,
supervise, manage, and eventually operate some or all of the industry involved.
Training programs may be established to further this last goal by creating a skilled,
indigenous workforce. It can be negotiated that this workforce be employed by the
MNCs, that products purchased by the corporations be locally produced, and that
equipment imported by the MNC becomes the property of the state upon its arrival.
Further, the state may negotiate an increased level of equity in the contract or for a
share of the ﬁnal product.
This is not—nor is it meant to be—an exhaustive list of negotiable points; each
country must decide what is best for its development path. Yet each issue represents
a possible learning component on the part of the developing country. Each suc
cessfully negotiated concession chips away at the MNCs’ monopoly of information
and control; cumulatively, they shift the relative bargaining strength toward the
host country (Moran, 1974, p. 165).
A principle criticism of Moran’s theory is that it fails to account for the MNCs’
corresponding learning curve: by treating the MNC as an exogenous variable in the
bargaining interface, it is considered to be a constant, with only the state allowed to
change, improve, and learn. Although initially considered, giving equal consider
ation to the MNCs’ bargaining experience proved to be beyond the scope of this
article: the description of negotiations would have been twice as complex and
lengthy and its focus on developing countries sacriﬁced.
Nor does this analysis present a comprehensive list of all the players potentially
affecting the bargaining scenario. There are, in fact, many possible actors that could
affect the contractual decision-making process: the multinational’s home country,
competing MNCs, the developing country’s state oil enterprise, and non
governmental organizations or other interest groups. To maintain a suitably tight
focus and provide for manageable games, this article has narrowed the number of
actors examined to two.
As such, contract negotiations between the MNC and the developing country are
characterized as strategic interactions between two actors seeking a mutually accept
able arrangement while each attempts to maximize its own proﬁt. This situation is
sufﬁciently generalizable as to allow analysis through the methodology of game
theory, the subject to which we now turn.
Game Theory and Bayesian Equilibrium Analysis
Given the preceding characterization of contract negotiations between MNCs and
developing countries, when such contracts are negotiated the interface conforms to
the essential tenets of game theory. The bargaining is strategic; this means that the
bargaining position of each actor at each decision point is a function of the per
ceived strategic preferences of the other player. The perceptions of these prefer
ences are modiﬁed through a learning process. This updating of beliefs and
strategies in response to the other actor’s moves is known as Bayesian equilibrium
analysis.
The game with which this paper is concerned is an example of international
bargaining. According to Morrow (1994), interactions such as this should not be
viewed as games of chance or games against nature with given, static probabilities.

Instead, the negotiation process is better characterized as each actor making
strategic decisions while uncertain about the behavior of the other. The
probability assessment of each is shaped by a perception of the other’s prefer
ences and possible responses. As such, probabilities are subjective and subject to
change.
The game is extensive in form. Players—each is seen as a uniﬁed entity—are
faced with dual choices at each decision node. While clearly simpliﬁcations of reality,
these assumptions are not to be seen as methodological liabilities; game theory’s
strength lies not in accurate description but in generalization. It is this ability to
reduce a complex strategic interaction to a form applicable to other, similar situa
tions and, by so doing, foretell behavior that is valuable to the academic process
(Morrow, 1994, p. 1).
The strategizing, recalculating process of a bargaining game may be described as
each actor identifying the available negotiating outcomes, ranking them to establish
his preference ordering, formulating an assessment of his opponent’s perceived
preferences, and using this assessment to predict his opponent’s likely bargaining
strategies.
Previous interactions with, or the historical reputation of, the opposing player
may color a player’s perceptions. However, the absence of previous interaction—or
one of the actor’s lack of experience in the industry or bargaining scenario—may
create a wide margin of error in probability calculation. It is important that strategic
recalculation and probability reassessment is possible after the actor better under
stands the game and his or her opponent. An actor’s preferences are revealed by
his or her moves; each is able to readjust or reassess his or her strategy based on a
reﬁned perception of his or her counterpart’s preferences. Bayesian equilibrium
analysis is characterized by this possibility for readjustment of beliefs in response to
observed events; this allows for the concept of learning during the bargaining
process.
Collaborative effort can increase the size of the pie to be divided—and the
absolute returns to each party—in the bargaining scenario at hand. Another of
Moran’s charts clearly illustrates this concept (Figure 1).
Game theory analyzes all possible strategies for each actor involved; as such,
developing countries can gain signiﬁcant insight into their own behavior and
strategies and become more efﬁcient bargainers. If a rigorous methodology is
applied to the mapping out of its strategic interactions, a developing country can
proceed more quickly along its learning curve or along a steeper curve, as illus
trated by Moran’s graph (Figure 2).
Logic, not complex mathematics, forms the core of the game presented in this
paper; the extensive form was chosen to increase the game’s applicability across
multiple situations. The intent was to provide a methodological framework for
systematic analysis of the negotiation process, within the context of Moran’s learn
ing curve concept and, by so doing, examine Moran’s assertion that developing
countries learn by doing and that game theory offers a method by which developing
countries can systematize and better understand the bargaining process, learn to be
efﬁcient bargainers, and ascend the learning curve at an accelerated rate. The
resulting game is applicable to the systematic analysis of bargaining between other
developing country governments and MNCs.

Figure 1. Moran’s Learning Curve Illustrating Total Returns to the Foreign Investor and the Host Country.
Source: Moran (1974, p. 162).

Figure 2. Moran’s Accelerated Learning Curve.
Source: Moran (1974, p. 167).

Case Study: Nigeria
Since its independence from colonial rule in 1960, the Nigerian government has
focused on, and become increasingly dependent on, its oil industry for revenues.
Also since that time, Nigeria’s oil industry has been characterized by the dominance
of large foreign corporations. Even so, Nigeria has realized a degree of success in its
dealings with oil multinationals, steadily improving its position through negotia
tion, at least for the ﬁrst two decades following independence.

However, the argument will also be made that Nigeria could have been more
successful in its endeavors. This is because Nigeria has failed to fulﬁll the more
advanced stages of learning deﬁned in Moran’s theory (the development of moni
toring, supervising, and operating skills to increase control over its oil industry). In
the event, Nigeria did advance on its bargaining learning curve, as will be demon
strated, but then the state took measures to give back the negotiated concessions.
Instead of continuing to promote indigenous capacities to monitor, supervise, and
operate its oil industry, Nigeria reversed course and actively prevented local par
ticipation in nearly all areas of the industry. As it stands, Nigeria’s oil industry
is controlled and run, de facto, by multinational oil companies (Asante, 1981;
Atsegbua, 1992; Biersteker, 1980, 1987).

Historical Overview of Nigeria’s Bargaining Policy Decisions in the
Petroleum Industry
In 1938, while Nigeria was still under British rule, the colonial government granted
a nationwide monopoly oil exploration license (OEL) to the British and Dutch
government-owned company Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum. This
company, which later became the Shell-BP Petroleum Company, retained its
monopoly control of Nigeria’s oil up until nearly the end of the colonial period.
Shell-BP made Nigeria’s ﬁrst commercially viable oil discovery in 1956 and began
exportation in 1958. International interest in Nigeria’s oil subsequently surged.
Also in 1958, in the zeitgeist of the approaching end to colonial rule, the govern
ment repealed a section of the 1914 Mineral Oils Ordinance, allowing non-British
companies the right to explore for oil in Nigeria.
As a result, Nigeria began granting OELs to a number of foreign oil companies
even before its independence in 1960. However, the legislation governing these new
concessions remained the Mineral Oils Ordinance of 1914, a vestige of colonial rule.
The concessions granted by Nigeria to foreign oil companies at this time were full
concessions: they granted across-the-board power to the oil companies for the
entire range of petroleum activities. Nigeria received no compensation other than
royalty payments (United Nations [UN], 1982). The concessions were also lengthy
in duration: those agreed upon during colonial rule ranged from 50 to 100 years.
Asante (1981) paints a bleak picture of concessions granted under colonial rule:
In many cases the companies paid a nominal rent of, say, 150 Naira for a whole concession,
plus one or two bottles of rum. There was no royalty in the modern sense, that is, a ﬁxed
percentage of the gross proceeds of the resources. What purported to be a royalty—and
this was a subsequent addition—was a provision for the payment of a minute percentage,
say three to ﬁve percent of the declared proﬁts of the companies. (p. 25)

Of course, without the business, pricing, or technical knowledge that the MNCs
possessed, Nigeria had no way to verify declared company proﬁts.
Following independence, the situation began to change, but Nigeria was not yet
ready for direct negotiations with the oil companies, nor was it ready to participate
actively in the development of its industry. In fact, in 1962, when the Italian-based
MNC Agip Oil offered the Nigerian government the option to acquire a 30-percent
equity share in its subsidiary company if commercial production of oil was attained,

the Nigerian government—unprepared to venture into the unknown—turned
down the offer (Asidou, 1979, quoted in Onyeji, 1990). Similar offers of equity
interest in operations were made to Nigeria by both Shell-BP and Texaco, but
because it lacked technical experience and bargaining skills, the government felt it
safer to continue merely collecting rents on its oil.
In the early years of independence, some of the advances Nigeria made with
respect to the major oil companies involved the collection of royalties. The royalty
system was revised to include a nominal rent payment for the use of land, an excise
proﬁt tax, an import duties tax, and a small percentage tax on each barrel of oil that
was sold. This tax was based on the price that the oil company declared it had
received on the world market (which, again, Nigeria had no way to verify). Addi
tionally, the concession periods were shortened in length, from 50–100 years to 40
years (with the option for the lessee to renew for a further period of 40 years). They
subsequently were shortened to 20 years, and later on, in some cases, to ﬁve.
Despite these advances, Nigeria was still extremely dependent on foreign-based
oil corporations to develop and run the industry and had little control over these
corporations or, indeed, over the amount of revenues it could collect from them.
However, it is important to point out that this situation of nearly complete depen
dence on the oil multinationals during the 1960s was common to virtually all
developing countries that possessed oil, many of which were just emerging from or
still under colonial rule. This dependence also stemmed from the concentrated
power and monopoly of technology that the “seven sisters” oil companies possessed
on the world stage: their operations covered the full range of upstream and
downstream oil production—from exploration and production, through transpor
tation and reﬁning, to marketing and retailing the ﬁnished products.2
Thus, during the greater part of the 1960s Nigeria played a passive rentcollecting role regarding its oil industry, making no moves to renegotiate contracts
with MNCs, unlike its counterpart developing states of Algeria, Iraq, and Libya,
which took unilateral action in abolishing concession agreements (Onyeji, 1990,
p. 86). Even so, Nigeria did witness a swift rise in the government’s revenue. This
was a result of the growth in domestic oil production during the 1960s and from the
higher royalty rates accruing from this oil. These revenues immediately became a
bone of contention among the different regions of the newly independent state:
under the federally legislated principle of derivation, the regions were entitled to the
revenue generated in their own territory. Because Nigeria’s oil is located in the
southern part of the country, the North and West were gradually being excluded
from the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of the oil boom.
As a result, the North and West formed an alliance to counter the Eastern region
(which comprised the oil-rich South). This led to two military coups in 1966, the
East’s secession from the federation, and eventually to the 1967–70 Civil War, which
claimed 2 million lives.
Although the ﬁghting of the civil war had a great deal to do with the prospect of
future oil wealth, ethnic differences and rivalries were incited in the process. As a
result, Nigeria’s oil boom, beginning in the early 1970s, came at a time when the
state was concerned with the task of postwar reconstruction. The military leadership
recognized that the reconstruction needed to be done in a regionally propitiative
manner.

Shortly before the cease-ﬁre, the federal government enacted legislation whereby
all revenues would accrue to the central government, to be divided proportionally
among the states. At about the same time, the military government issued the
Petroleum Decree of 1969, which replaced the Mineral Oils Ordinance of 1914. It
was the country’s ﬁrst major attempt at producing a detailed and comprehensive
law deﬁning the rights and obligations of oil licensees. Signiﬁcantly, it also vested
the ownership and control of all petroleum interests in the central government.
This decree was issued seven years after the UN had adopted Resolution 1803,
which afﬁrmed the principle of states’ inalienable right to permanent sovereignty
over their own natural resources. Although now generally accepted as a basic
principle of international law, its passage was a major breakthrough for developing
countries. At the time of the UN Resolution’s passage in 1962, it empowered and
gave conﬁdence to newly independent countries all over the world to develop their
resources as they saw ﬁt and no doubt played a major role in the promulgation of
Nigeria’s 1969 Petroleum Decree. This decree signiﬁed an important (legal) step in
the government’s learning curve of how to do business with powerful foreign
corporations.
Not long after this, in July 1971, Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Joining OPEC was a watershed moment in the
development of the Nigerian oil industry. In fact, it would be difﬁcult to overstate
the importance of this membership’s role in Nigeria’s gaining of knowledge,
control, and bargaining ability with regard to its oil industry. Nigeria was able to
take advantage of other OPEC-member country experiences and guidelines and
adopt laws already enacted by these countries. It also gave a tremendous boost to
Nigeria’s bargaining position within the international oil industry, as Nigeria began
to negotiate for concessions and contractual particulars similar to those of other
OPEC member states.
OPEC was formed in 1960 by major oil-producing developing countries as “an
act of protest . . . a revolt against the highhandedness of the multinational oil
companies” that had kept the price of oil “artiﬁcially low” (OPEC, 1984, p. 182).
Events that led to the organization’s founding included the oil companies unilater
ally abrogating and then reducing the posted prices for Middle Eastern and Ven
ezuelan oil, ﬁrst in February 1959 and again in August 1960. This reduction of
posted oil prices (which served as the basis for income under the existing royalty
payment system) meant a sudden, unexpected reduction in revenues for the pro
ducer countries.
The shock suffered as a result of this unexpected and uncontrollable event, as
well as the realization that oil prices had been kept artiﬁcially low by the multina
tionals, gave these countries a strong desire to take control over the price of their
product, and thus over their domestic economies. It also provided a strong ratio
nale for these countries to join in unity against the powerful MNCs.
The OPEC countries thus did “band together to form a highly effective bargain
ing unit in dealings with major oil companies” (U.S. Congress, 1973). Some of the
resolutions the OPEC member countries agreed upon over the next decade were a
55-percent tax rate for all member countries and an increase in the government’s
levy on each barrel of oil from 30 cents per barrel in 1970 to 65 cents per barrel in
1971. The member countries also agreed to raise the posted price—the price at

which they would sell their oil on the world market—with subsequent price hikes
to occur at regular intervals. They further moved to gain control over their oil
industries and prices by controlling the amount of oil that would be produced
within their borders.
Also signiﬁcant regarding ownership for the oil-producing countries was the
OPEC/Geneva agreement signed in 1972 that required member governments to
own a 25-percent equity share in the foreign companies’ operations. This rate was
to be gradually increased to 51 percent by 1982, creating host country majority
ownership in the MNC subsidiaries conducting business on their soil. Perhaps the
most important OPEC requirement, at least as far as Nigeria was concerned, was the
statute mandating the creation of a national, state-run oil company. The aim of this
provision was for each country to learn how to run and control all aspects of its oil
industry.
Article 90 of OPEC’s Resolution XVI of 1968 enjoined member states to “seek
participation in the equity of existing concessions” (OPEC, 1984), requiring Nigeria
to acquire, by 1982, a majority participating interest in the oil company subsidiaries’
operations within its borders. This stipulation, along with the collective knowledge
provided by fellow OPEC member states of oil industry workings in such areas as
pricing, taxation, and contract negotiations, provided Nigeria with both mandate
and conﬁdence to initiate negotiations and enter into new types of contracts with
the oil MNCs.
The Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was formed in 1971 to fulﬁll
OPEC’s membership requirements. It subsequently merged with the Oil Ministry to
form the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977. The NNPC is
an agency of the federal government and exercises supervisory and regulatory
control over the oil MNCs operating in Nigeria; it became the instrument through
which the government was able to carry out OPEC’s participation mandate. In
1972, the federal government vested all exploration and production rights in
Nigerian territory in the NNPC, with the exception of those areas in which petro
leum grants already existed (these would also become subject to renegotiation).
Therefore, from this point in time, the NNPC conducted all contract negotiations
with the MNCs. The NNPC was further empowered to prospect for, mine, and
market oil and to engage in all other activities associated with the petroleum
industry. This ultimately empowered it to monitor, supervise, and eventually run
Nigeria’s oil industry—in theory. The discussion of whether the NNPC has been
successful in these endeavors will be taken up later. There is no denying, however,
that the state’s establishment of a national oil company played a central role in the
expansion of Nigeria’s role in its own oil industry and boosted its conﬁdence and
ability to negotiate one-on-one with the powerful MNCs.
Following the establishment of the NNPC, the success that Nigeria experienced
in negotiations is most clearly illustrated by two notable developments. First,
Nigeria followed the lead of other OPEC nations and entered into new forms of
contracts with the oil multinationals. Second, it negotiated for a greater share of
both proﬁts and equity in existing and future contracts with the MNCs.
Before launching into a discussion of the negotiation advances Nigeria made at
that time, it is important to add to this historical overview two important govern
mental edicts resulting from Nigeria’s drive to increase participation in and control

of its oil industry: the indigenization decrees of 1972 and 1979. In 1972, the military
government again heeded ongoing domestic calls for economic nationalism by
agreeing to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, the ﬁrst of the two Nige
rian Indigenization Decrees.3 The promulgation of this act was also motivated by
the drive to meet OPEC demands; the decree’s strategy for action was control based
on indigenous ownership and the need to use the oil industry as a vehicle for rapid
economic development. The 1977 decree was an extension of the ﬁrst decree, with
further-reaching and more stringent regulations. It served to tighten up loopholes
in the 1972 decree (Biersteker, 1980).
The decrees were intended to transfer a certain percentage of all foreign-owned
businesses to Nigerian citizens; this included the multinational oil companies doing
business in Nigeria. Other policies included dividing all foreign-owned economic
activities into three categories and stipulating the level of equity sharing, which
would be mandatory for each type of business, reserving certain areas for local
capital. They further mandated that a certain percentage of Nigerians be employed
at all levels of foreign-owned businesses. The policies were undertaken in order to
reduce excessive foreign dependence and hasten the move to self-reliance in the oil
industry.
The Indigenization Decrees were important development steps for Nigeria in
setting the legal context for bargaining with the MNCs. We will return to a discus
sion of the effects—and effectiveness—of the decrees later. Next, let us examine the
change in concession agreements once Nigeria commenced negotiations with the oil
companies.
Starting in 1971, Nigeria began direct negotiations with the international oil
companies through its newly created state-owned oil corporation, the NNPC. One
of the goals of these negotiations was to increase equity participation to meet
OPEC’s mandate of, eventually, a 51-percent ownership interest in the MNCs’
subsidiaries. One method for furthering this goal was to scrap traditional concession
agreements and negotiate for (at the time) innovative agreements such as joint
ventures, participation agreements, production-sharing agreements, and risk
service contracts. All of these new types of contracts increased developing countries’
participation rates and provided an avenue for the acquisition of petroleum tech
nology and the training of Nigerians in said technology as well as in managerial and
supervisory roles. The contracts spell out the legal relationship between the part
ners and lay down rules and procedures for the joint development of the areas
concerned.4
The mere act of making such a speciﬁc, legally binding contract with each of the
MNCs operating within its borders gave Nigeria a great deal of experience in terms
of bargaining and doing business. Many aspects of these contracts were copied from
those made in other OPEC countries—yet another instance in which Nigeria ben
eﬁted from membership in the cartel and access to member countries’ otherwise
conﬁdential information.
Another of Nigeria’s goals for the renegotiation of contracts was a reduction in
the duration of concession agreements. Nigeria was able to reduce terms of many
agreements to a length of ﬁve years from 30 to 40.
In 1971, the NNOC (later the NNPC) came to the bargaining table with the
individual MNCs and requested a 35-percent ownership participation from each of

them. In 1975, a round of renegotiations commenced, and the request was raised
to 55 percent: in 1979, to 60 percent. Most companies signed agreements of assent
to participation (at the 55-percent level) in 1974, and the policies became effective
in the same year. Two holdout companies, Texaco and Standard Oil of California,
ﬁnally agreed to the 55-percent level of Nigerian ownership in 1978.5
The NNPC was also charged with the responsibility of awarding licenses and
leases for oil development. The form that these new leases and licenses took, as well
as the rights conferred and risks shared, were novel for Nigeria. These new agree
ments included the OELs, Oil Prospecting Licenses, and the Oil Mining Lease. The
NNPC reserved the right of revocation in all of the above if the licensee or lessee was
not conducting operations continuously or in a vigorous and businesslike manner,
or otherwise failed to meet the conditions stipulated in the agreement.
In all of these measures, the changes in concessions and contracts reﬂected a
fundamental shift in bargaining power between Nigeria and the MNCs. Nigeria
commenced negotiations and successfully met its demands vis-à-vis the MNCs.
There was also a marked increase in the government’s revenue from the oil
industry between 1971 and 1980 (Atsegbua, 1992, pp. 26–27).

The Bargaining Game
The game modeled here is an example of international bargaining, characterized
by strategic decision making by each actor under conditions of uncertainty regard
ing the behavior of his or her counterpart, who, in turn, is trying to estimate the
other’s likely behavior—a two-player noncooperative bargaining game under
incomplete information. Probabilities and beliefs are not given or ﬁxed—they are
subjective and subject to revision and recalculation. In this way, an opponent may
reassess or readjust his strategy based on a reﬁned perception of his counterpart’s
preferences through a revealed move. This possibility for readjustment in response
to observed events characterizes Bayesian equilibrium analysis, which allows for the
concept of learning during the bargaining process.
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, a world consisting of two actors: the MNC
and the developing country (or state). We further assume that the developing
country has little to no experience in bargaining, while the MNC’s experience is
extensive. In addition to bargaining experience, the MNC possesses intricate tech
nical, logistical, business, and legal knowledge of all aspects of the oil industry.
The developing country, on the other hand, does not possess such knowledge or
experience.
Each player possesses knowledge of the outcomes of similar previous negotia
tions involving OPEC member countries and MNCs. In other words, both parties
know that other developing countries have successfully negotiated outcomes similar
to those that Nigeria is seeking. Furthermore, once the game between the state and
one MNC has been executed, the other MNCs operating in that state will be aware
of its outcome (and arguably more likely to agree to similar concessions).
Each square or node represents a choice for one of the actors; the actor making
the choice is labeled below the square. There are two branches from each choice
node, indicating the choices available to the actor. The choice of any circle—if

Figure 3. The MNC/LDC Bargaining Game for Nigeria.
MNC, multinational corporation; LDC, less developed country.

taken—represents an end to the game. A timeline below the game illustrates the
real-time duration of the negotiations. An illustration of the game appears in
Figure 3.
This game is modeled on actual negotiations between Nigeria and the oil MNCs,
beginning in 1971. As stated earlier, membership in OPEC spurred on these
negotiations; the cartel required that by 1982 each member state possess at least a
51-percent equity (ownership) in all local subsidiaries of foreign-owned oil compa
nies. In the earlier game, Player 1, the state, makes the ﬁrst move. The state has two
choices at this time: it can do nothing or it can negotiate for an increased percentage
of equity/ownership in the subsidiary companies of the foreign-based oil MNCs.
If the state chooses the upper node and does nothing, the game is over (the
reader will recall that Nigeria made this decision on a number of occasions prior to
1971). If the state negotiates for an increase in equity from the MNCs, then the
game continues to the second play, where the MNC (Player 2) takes its turn and has
two choices (or moves): either to accept or reject the state’s attempt to gain a
percentage of equity in its subsidiary company.6 If the MNC rejects the state’s
negotiation attempt, the game ends (and we presume that this decision is an exit
option—that the MNC pulls out of the state because it does not agree to the
increasing demands that the state is making on foreign corporations.)7 If, however,
the MNC agrees to the state’s proposed equity increase, the game continues. In fact,
the second half of the game—illustrated in Figure 4—is simply a repetition of the
ﬁrst half as the state attempts, over time, to negotiate for an even greater percentage
of equity/ownership in the subsidiary companies of the MNCs.
The numbers within the parentheses generally represent payoffs. (In this case,
they correspond to the percentage equity ownership under negotiation.) The ﬁrst
number is the payoff (percentage) to the ﬁrst player, the second to the second
player—should the option(s) leading to that game-ending node be chosen. In this
game, the parties negotiate over the division of an equity value of 100, which the

Figure 4. The MNC/LDC Bargaining Game for Nigeria with Payoffs.
MNLC, multinational corporation.

MNC possesses in full at the commencement of the game. It should be borne in
mind that these payoffs, like the game itself, represent extreme simpliﬁcations of a
highly complex reality and serve as a tool to aid in understanding the bargaining
process.
In the ﬁrst payoff, where the state does nothing, the payoff is 0 for the state and
100 for the MNC, assuming that the state has 0 percent equity and the MNC has
100 percent equity in the subsidiary companies at the commencement of negotia
tions. As the rules for this game state earlier, if the state negotiates for an increase
in equity of the MNC’s subsidiary and the MNC rejects, the MNC ceases operations
and pulls out of the state. The payoffs in this case are 0 for the state, and –S for the
MNC, which represents the negative sunk costs (losses) the MNC faces for having
made its investments and then ceasing operations and pulling out of the state. If,
however, the state negotiates for an increase in equity in the MNC’s subsidiary
operations and the MNC agrees, the payoffs are 35 to the state and 65 to the MNC.
The second illustration also depicts a break in the game at this point. In fact, the
game could end here and a new one be started once the state attempts to renego
tiate for a higher equity share, with the payoffs reﬂecting what has transpired in the
previous game. Should the state decide to do nothing, the payoffs will remain as the
previous game ended—35 for the state and 65 for the MNC. If the state negotiates
for an increased equity share and the MNC rejects this—keeping in mind that in
our game this means that the MNC ceases operations and pulls out of the state—the
payoffs are 0 for the state and –S (sunk costs) for the MNC. If, however, the state
renegotiates for the increased equity share and the MNC accepts, the payoffs are 60
for the state and 40 for the MNC. Again, these numbers are meant to reﬂect actual
Nigerian negotiation outcomes. If the state can succeed in arriving at the lowerright (South-East) game nodes, its payoffs have increased (from 0 to 35 in the ﬁrst

game and from 35 to 60 in the second game) and we can say that it has been
successful in bargaining with the MNC.
As noted earlier, the game and payoffs mirror actual negotiations that took place
between Nigeria (through the NNPC) and the petroleum multinationals from 1971
to 1979.8 In 1971 the NNOC requested a 35-percent level of equity participation
from the MNCs’ subsidiaries operating in Nigeria. By 1974 most companies—
including Agip, Marathon, Texaco/Chevron, Phillips, and Mobil—had signed
“agreements of assent to participation,” which signiﬁed their acceptance of Nige
ria’s negotiated equity level. In 1975 the NNPC raised the equity level to 55
percent; in 1979 the level was again raised, to 60 percent. In both cases, the
companies agreed to this negotiated level of higher equity for Nigeria.9 In terms of
bargaining for increased equity ownership, we can conclude that Nigeria had (at
least some degree of) success in the negotiations it undertook with the MNCs.
Challenges to Nigeria’s Success
The case has now been made that Nigeria did, in fact, do better for itself over time
in bargaining and doing business with foreign-based oil multinationals: it ascended
its learning curve. However, Nigeria’s is not an unabashed success story, and the
argument will now be made that it could have done better in a number of areas.
This section addresses the issue of Nigeria’s ultimate failure to gain the technical
capabilities necessary to run its oil industry—why the foreign-based MNCs still de
facto run Nigeria’s oil industry. It will argue that corruption played a determining
role in the state’s return of hard-won concessions to corporations, the repeal of
indigenization laws, and the forcible deterring of growing levels of local participa
tion in Nigeria’s oil industry.
Most scholars of Nigeria agree that the state negotiated considerable advances
vis-à-vis MNCs following its independence. It gained higher oil revenues, increased
its level of equity participation, and decreased the length of contracts vis-à-vis the
oil companies within its borders. In fact, it assumed a greater role overall in its
domestic economic activities. However, as Biersteker (1980), who has done the most
extensive work in this area, points out, an increase in the state’s activities does not
translate to greater effectiveness for the state, just as a simple increase in the level
of equity in the oil industry does not equal an increase in the amount of control over
that industry.
Let us return to the impact of the Nigerian Indigenization Decrees of 1972 and
1979. Domestically, the 1972 decree was initially hailed as a political and economic
milestone for the government, a major step toward Nigeria taking control over its
economy in general and over the oil industry in particular. And indeed at ﬁrst, the
indigenization decrees effectively functioned to beneﬁt indigenous businesses and
individuals. Yet because Nigeria did not come to possess the technological capabili
ties to run the complex oil industry over subsequent decades and because the
corporations did not implement many portions of the decree, including the
employment and training of Nigerians in their labor forces, the decrees eventually
came to be seen more as empty promises, even as measures to rationalize the
presence of foreign capital in the economy. Later, the military government would
reverse its course and eliminate the advances the indigenous groups made.

In order to ensure passage of the ﬁrst decree, local businessmen joined forces
and formed the Indigenous Businessmen’s Group. This group lobbied government
ofﬁcials to endorse the decree. As a result of their efforts, the state initiated pro
grams to encourage indigenous participation in the oil industry, requiring new oil
concessions to Nigerianize not less than 60 percent of jobs at all levels and not less
than 75 percent of management positions within ten years of obtaining their lease.
Additionally, in 1970 the Central Bank of Nigeria introduced credit guidelines and
stipulated minimum amounts of total lending for the commercial and merchant
banks operating in the country; this was to target sectors of the economy (including
the oil industry) and particular groups—notably indigenous private enterprise. To
further assist local capitalists to get started in the industry, the NNPC organized
indigenous individuals and small private companies to assist their entrepreneurial
efforts to market Nigerian crude oil, beginning in late 1979. As a result of this
encouragement by ofﬁcial powers, a number of local organizations—such as the
Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria—emerged.
This honeymoon between the government and private indigenous business was
not to last, however. The growth of Nigeria’s oil industry during the 1970s coin
cided with two world oil price surges and produced an unprecedented windfall of
wealth for the country. Nigeria’s spending and investment decisions in the late
1970s proved unsustainable and ultimately left the state unprepared to face the
subsequent world oil price crashes of the 1980s. As a result, Nigeria faced a painful
economic recession during the 1980s that affected the country nearly as profoundly
as the windfall had in the previous decade.
In December 1983, the army once again took power after allegations of massive
governmental corruption, wasteful management of the economy, and mounting
external debts in the face of declining revenues. The civil government was replaced,
the short-lived Second Republic’s constitution was suspended, and many of the
indigenous advances made during the 1970s were stopped and shortly thereafter
reversed.
Following the coup d’etat in 1983, state support for local capitalists began to
disappear. The state took swift action to discourage further indigenous participation
in the oil industry. One of the steps taken was to declare illegal the previously
encouraged activities of indigenous groups, for example, the independent market
ing and selling of oil. The state also revoked the rights of indigenous businessmen
to make payments on credit while concurrently increasing the frequency and
restricting the acceptable methods of payments required to continue operating in
the oil industry. The multinational oil companies faced none of these restrictive
actions.
The NNPC further edged out local companies by not renewing their contracts
or by choosing foreign-based companies in competitive processes. By the end of
1985, the government had rather successfully curtailed indigenous participation
in the oil industry. Of all the local private companies that had emerged in the
encouraging atmosphere of the 1970s, only one survived by the early 1980s: the
Nigus Petroleum Company. Its operations were restricted to the exploration stage
only (Onyeji, 1990, pp. 104–5). It was denied permits to participate in all other
areas of petroleum development even though it had applied for them. In fact, to
give an example of the change in the state’s priorities, in 1983, out of 13 permits

issued by the NNPC to do exploratory work for future oil pipeline routes, 12
went to just four foreign oil companies. The single remaining permit was
reserved for the NNPC. However, in the following year the NNPC turned this
permit over to Shell BP because it did not possess the capabilities to carry out the
survey operation itself. Clearly then, the government’s reversal of its policy that
originally encouraged local entrepreneurship played a key role in discouraging
indigenous participation and limiting local control in Nigeria’s oil industry. In
addition, the state deterred locals from gaining employment or experience within
the industry by not enforcing employment quotas stipulated for the MNCs by the
Indigenization Decrees. This further hindered the country’s stated desire to
control its oil industry.
To make matters worse, in 1977, even as Nigeria negotiated for a higher level of
equity in the MNC subsidiaries, it was taking counter measures to “sweeten the
deal” for the MNCs by offering them a package of ﬁscal incentives that were
unprecedented in their level of generosity. These included the following: The ﬁrst
was an exploration incentive, whereby the government agreed to pay for any
unsuccessful wells. The second was a petroleum proﬁt tax, which provided for the
write-off of pre-production costs and further offered a reduced tax rate to the
companies that allowed them to pay just 15 percent instead of the OPEC-standard
rate of 85 percent. The third was a royalty incentive, which offered a lower rate of
royalties than the going OPEC rate for oil found offshore, which is where large
quantities of Nigerian crude had recently been discovered. The fourth was the
investment tax credit, which encouraged and rewarded oil companies for making
new investments in the country. This provided a tax bonus for any asset obtained
for the purpose of petroleum operations in an amount equal to the investment. A
ﬁfth incentive offered that companies could recover their investments in ﬁve equal
installments, in line with the trend in international oil markets (Onyeji, 1990,
pp. 91–96).
In all of these incentives the state appears to be giving back to the oil companies
the advances it made in the negotiations since bargaining had begun, just six years
earlier. It is puzzling why Nigeria would consider such an incentive package to be
in its best interest because no other OPEC countries did this either at that time or,
indeed, at any time up to the present. In fact, by this time, many developing
countries had “learned” the negotiation tactic of playing MNCs off each other to
obtain further concessions (Singh, 2000, 2008). This was something Nigeria was
perfectly positioned to do. The MNCs in Nigeria were not eager to leave the
country: they had high-sunk costs and were already earning considerable proﬁts
from Nigeria’s high-quality oil.
While Nigeria’s motivation in offering this package to the corporations was,
arguably, to encourage investment and exploration, in the long run it meant
considerably lower earnings. As will be argued later, the overly generous incentives
given to the MNCs were likely the result of a marked increase in corruption on the
part of the Nigerian government and its representatives in the NNPC that altered
the assumptions and perceived payoffs for the actors in negotiations. It is possible
that those bargaining on behalf of the state came to believe that a short-term
outcome that would beneﬁt them (or those in power) on a personal level, combined
with a negligible risk of being held accountable for such behavior, outweighed the

importance of any longer-term considerations. We are not privy to the actual
negotiations, yet backward induction may be employed to determine what players
perceived as their optimal move(s). In this case, we know that government-level
corruption reached unprecedented levels in Nigeria during the period from the
late 1970s through the mid-1980s, increasing through multiple, quick succession
changes of leadership. This external shift in political realities may have, in turn,
shifted the actors’ assumptions and perceived payoffs. It would, in fact, be possible
to formulate a new extensive form game based upon the observed outcomes from
this new round of negotiations. However, it is beyond the scope and length limita
tions of this article to do so.
In terms of acquiring the skills necessary to increase participation in and control
over the country’s own oil industry, Biersteker (1987) argues that the MNCs ﬁgured
out methods to retain de facto control over their subsidiaries, so that losing equity as
a result of the negotiations was not a serious threat to either their operations or
their proﬁtability. Biersteker asserts that the MNCs have retained day-to-day
control over the oil industry in Nigeria; in his interviews with senior executives of
23 of the largest MNCs operating in Nigeria, none expressed concern over loss of
power because of Nigeria’s increased equity participation. In fact, they have main
tained effective managerial control regardless.
The MNCs have also retained their technical expertise by not training Nigerians,
and in many cases they have managed to obtain exemptions from regulations not to
their liking, as the state never enforced the few regulatory provisions that did make
their way into negotiated agreements. Thus, Nigerians did not obtain skills in
Moran’s more advanced categories of knowledge: the operating and supervisory
skills necessary to run their own oil industry and reduce dependence on foreign
corporations.
The NNPC, in which so much hope was placed for taking control of Nigeria’s oil
industry, has also fallen short of expectations in a number of ways. Although it was
intended to grow into an organization engaged in the entire spectrum of upstream
and downstream oil development, it has remained almost a strictly administrative
body, only marginally involved in the exploratory stage of oil development. While
it saved for itself a number of the licenses it had the power to grant, it never used
any of them (Onyeji, 1990, p. 118). Furthermore, as of the 1990s, the NNPC did not
own any of the equipment or facilities used in oil operations; those that it uses, it
rents from the MNCs. Even in the exploration arena, the NNPC depended on the
MNCs for both equipment and technology. Similarly, the six port terminals used for
the export of oil were built and remain owned by MNCs, while all the tankers that
transport oil out of Nigeria are also foreign owned, and again the NNPC rents those
that it uses. By renting all of the equipment and materials listed earlier, Nigeria
actually pays multiple times over not only for the ﬁnal product—reﬁned oil, most of
which it must import—but also for the very possibility of engaging in the operation
of its own oil industry.
As of 2003, the government had been defaulting on its funding and payments to
its joint venture partners—the MNC oil companies—for years. As these debts must
be paid back with interest, the use of the term “joint venture” appears increasingly
specious (Akinrele, 2003, emphasis added). During this time, and as a stated result
of the NNPC’s corruption levels, the government curtailed its access to funding.

This hindered the NNPC’s ability to cover payment arrears as well as the possibility
of forming future joint ventures.
Additionally, Nigeria’s oil reﬁneries suffer intermittent shutdowns and are oper
ating well below installed capacity. Resulting shortages have caused the country’s
heavy reliance on imported petroleum products, which has served to deplete
foreign exchange earnings. This also means that continued subsidization of oil in
Nigeria becomes increasingly expensive for the government, while threats to lift
these subsidies result in riots, strikes, and other violent acts by the Nigerians.
Because Nigerians know that the oil sector lies at the root of many of their prob
lems, violence against the MNCs’ property and employees has mushroomed over
the years as well.
In addition to the above, there are still other challenges facing the NNPC.
Nigeria is known for being an extremely corrupt country10; this corruption has
affected the NNPC. In 1979, around the same time that the concessions were
being given back to the MNCs, the NNPC was accused of “losing” 2.4 billion
Naira from its accounts. This money was later discovered to be deposited in
private accounts of NNPC employees at the British Midland Bank in London. An
additional 12 billion Naira was reported missing through secret oil contracts
involving third-party agents. Even when these contracts were considered legiti
mate, the contractual middlemen would regularly keep the NNPC’s money
in their own private accounts longer than agreed upon, taking advantage of
Nigeria’s rising inﬂation rates to make even more money on the sales (Onyeji,
1990, pp. 122–23).
Following closely upon the heels of the above, a Nigerian newspaper reported
that 2.8 billion Naira was missing from the NNPC’s coffers (Igweonwu, 1984,
p. 272; Onyeji, 1990). As a result, in 1980 a Judicial Commission of Inquiry was set
up to investigate these claims. Although the tribunal did not discover the where
abouts of the missing money, it reported other ﬁndings that contributed to the
NNPC’s record of scandals. One of these was that none of the service contracts
executed between the NNPC and the operating companies had ever been signed
and approved and were therefore still operating as “gentlemen’s agreements.” This
situation was ﬁnally rectiﬁed in 1991 (Akinrele, 2003). Further, the tribunal
reported that because of corrupt NNPC policies, such as those mentioned earlier,
the government had lost 2.5 billion Naira in oil revenue, just from the years 1975
to 1978 (Onyeji, 1990). As a result of its ﬁndings, the tribunal proposed a funda
mental reorganization of the NNPC including forming ﬁve wholly owned subsid
iaries to carry out the various upstream and downstream oil industry functions,
which the NNPC had not yet developed the capabilities to undertake in any case
(Igweonwu, 1984). This restructuring was recommended to shift a great deal of
authority away from the chief executive of the NNPC, who had up to that point
wielded an inordinate “concentration of power” (Federal Republic of Nigeria,
1980). Financial control was also wrested from the NNPC, with the result that the
NNPC now needs government approval for almost any signiﬁcant ﬁnancial deci
sions or investments (Akinrele, 2003).
Thus, evidence exists of the presence of the kind of corruption typically
associated with negotiations over petroleum: secret deals that pad the bank
accounts of those in the position to beneﬁt from their closed-door, undisclosed

nature. This type of corruption—basically bribery—is common to negotia
tions between representatives from developing countries and multinational oil
corporations.
In contrast, the Nigerian government’s decision to proactively wipe out what had
up to then been increasingly successful local participation in the petroleum sector
may also be attributable to corruption, but it most likely did not come about as a
result of the negotiations with MNCs and was rather a policy taken by a government
coming to embody a patronage system that prioritized the enrichment and
entrenchment of its elites. This type of sabotage of previously existing local eco
nomic participation in the petroleum industry seems to be unique to Nigeria, and
corporations do not generally bargain for this in their negotiations, as they gener
ally realize that some level of indigenous participation in the petroleum sector is, in
fact, in their best interests—it helps locals feel that they are beneﬁting from the
presence of a petroleum industry. An absence of local participation in this industry
can lead to local resentment—particularly if there is a lack of other employment
opportunities in the area—and can, in the extreme, lead to violence against the
MNCs if they come to be identiﬁed with the lack of economic opportunity or
development, exactly as has become the case in Nigeria.
In both cases, therefore, the puzzling “unlearning” evidenced through the rever
sal of previous policies appears to be Nigeria’s own doing, the result of increased
levels of unchecked corruption and the related recalculation of self-interested,
short-term strategies and not the result of the MNCs actually reasserting themselves
and winning the upper hand through negotiations.
The silver lining to this otherwise unfortunate state of affairs is that Nigeria has
demonstrated both learning and improved bargaining outcomes in the past. If the
government is willing to recommit itself to the reduction of corruption and discon
tinuation of the elite-dominated patronage system and restore an emphasis on the
development of its oil industry that takes a long-term perspective, progress and
more favorable outcomes are possible. Further, the methodology presented here—a
systemized use of game theory in which all assumptions are stated and strategies
revealed—offers a procedure by which a developing country can reﬁne its under
standing of the game at hand, discover a way to do better for itself, and thus
improve its negotiating skills.
Conclusion
This article applied Theodore Moran’s dynamic bargaining theory—that develop
ing countries do better for themselves over time as their experience with bargaining
grows—to the speciﬁc case of Nigeria. It showed that game theory, and speciﬁcally
Bayesian equilibrium analysis, can be a useful methodology for states to employ in
this development interface, as it forces each player to take into consideration not
just its own position but all the possible strategies and moves of its opponent before
acting. Once a move has been made and a preference revealed, the player can
adjust beliefs, recalculate expected probabilities and values, and better plan the
next move.
A further argument for the use of such modeling of strategic interaction, par
ticularly for developing countries, is that formal modeling forces a thorough

analysis of the situation at hand. This obligates the player to state its knowledge,
assumptions, and beliefs in entirety as well as its knowledge, beliefs, and assump
tions about the other player at every potential stage of the game. Doing so may
expose unstated information, reveal a gap in the knowledge about the game—or
about the other player—and/or even lead to the realization of alternate moves
or superior strategies. A complete knowledge of the game allows a player to
act in a rational, consistent manner and, as in the game described earlier, to
readjust beliefs as events change and eventually discover a way to do better for
itself.
Although the previous section painted a rather dismal picture of Nigeria’s ulti
mate ability to run its own oil industry, it is important to remember that the country
did make advances on its bargaining learning curve, particularly during the 1960s
and 1970s. As such, Nigeria’s situation serves as a valuable case study. The game
presented an example of Nigeria’s success in bargaining, an ascension on its learn
ing curve. However, it also would have been possible to construct a game analyzing
the concessions Nigeria made to the oil companies in the form of the ﬁscal incen
tives package of 1977, a game in which Nigeria negated the negotiated ownership
advances made during the same decade. In other words, Nigeria arguably
descended the learning curve.
The factors contributing to Nigeria’s stumbling blocks have been described
earlier. According to Moran’s theory, Nigeria—through both active and passive
measures—failed to acquire two necessary components for eventual control of its oil
industry: the supervisory and operational skills necessary to run such a technologi
cally complex industry. This article further made the case that a precipitous rise in
corruption may help explain the government’s otherwise puzzling reversal of
policies, beginning in the late 1970s, that ceased enforcement of successful pro
grams, forced Nigerian entrepreneurs out of the market, gave back important
advances through extremely generous concessions to the MNCs, and even repealed
indigenization laws.
Yet this need not have been the case: other OPEC countries such as Algeria,
Brazil, Venezuela, and Indonesia—none of which have been immune to
corruption—have achieved success in the acquisition of the skills and technology
necessary to run their own oil industries (Atsegbua, 1992). However, Nigeria’s
situation can change for the better: a serious governmental commitment either to
seeing through the policies commenced in the 1970s or to setting forth a new set of
policies that systematically promote indigenous development of the skills necessary
to supervise, manage, and operate the oil industry would set Nigeria on a course
toward an increase in its control over this industry. In the end, Nigeria’s case
provides a cautionary tale to the effect that without governmental commitment,
early victories do not guarantee continued success: ascension on the bargaining
learning curve is not a given.

Notes
1 See Vernon (1980). This concept was also thoroughly elaborated upon by Mikesell (1971, pp. 35–37)
and touched upon by Penrose (1959) in her discussion of exploitation of host countries by the oil
companies. However, the theory is generally attributed to Vernon.

2 The major international oil companies widely known as the “seven sisters” were British Petroleum,
Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, Standard Oil of California, and Texaco. See also Penrose
(1971).
3 The state did not, in fact, initiate this decree. It reacted to pressures from indigenous local capital and
large MNCs in ﬁnally agreeing to the decree. The ﬁnal composition of the decree, as well as its results,
reﬂect this collaboration. See Biersteker (1987).
4 Joint Ventures can include the following features: the Participation Agreement, which is negotiated
on an individual basis and speciﬁes the respective rights and duties of the parties; the Operating
Agreement, spelling out the rules and procedure for the joint development of the areas concerned
and the property jointly owned by the partners; and the Memorandum of Understanding, also
signed on an individual basis, which commits the parties in the future to speciﬁed exploration,
production, and work programs. There is further the Production Sharing Agreement, which, at the
time that Nigeria signed its ﬁrst (and only, for at least a decade) proﬁt sharing agreement (PSA) in
1971 with Ashland Oil, was considered a novel type of agreement. In fact, Indonesia was the pioneer
of this type of agreement, and Nigeria was extremely slow to adopt or negotiate for the PSA—and
arguably far less successful in enforcing it.
5 These ﬁgures are given to provide an overview and are not comprehensive. For example, from 1979
to 1989, Nigeria held an 80-percent share of equity in the Shell/BP subsidiary. It is, however, beyond
the scope of this chapter to go into much greater detail regarding all of Nigeria’s equity agreements
with the various MNCs.
6 This is a simpliﬁcation for the purposes of keeping the game concise. In point of fact, the MNC could
try to negotiate for a lower equity percentage to be transferred to the state, but this possibility alone
would have resulted in virtually unlimited branches representing the choices available to the actors.
7 Biersteker (1980, p. 214) reports that only one of the hundreds of large, transnational corporations
operating in the country has chosen an exit option and pulled out of Nigeria because of its increasing
demands on foreign operations.
8 In fact, the game could be used to consider negotiations between a number of OPEC member states
and foreign-based oil MNCs as these developing countries negotiated for (OPEC-mandated)
increased equity shares of MNC subsidiaries within their borders.
9 These equity levels and the years mentioned earlier apply to the majority of MNCs in Nigeria but do
not apply uniformly for all of them. To give an example, Texaco and Standard of California
announced their ﬁnal agreement on a 55-percent equity in 1978.
10 Transparency International has published an annual Global Corruption Report since 1999. In each
year from 1999 to 2004, Nigeria ranked second from the last (meaning most corrupt) among all
countries in the survey. In 2005, it moved up to tie for sixth from last place. Data and rankings are
available at http://www.transparency.org. However, as of 2008, Nigeria had moved up signiﬁcantly in
these rankings, tied at 121st place (out of 180).
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